Simple Answers

When military doctrine forged over the course of centuries and tested in wars big and small prove the rule that an insufficiency of resources is antithetical to success, trying to fight on the cheap is not likely to succeed.

Col. Jacobs, with all due respect, the history of warfare is studded with examples of outmoded thinking, based on conventional wisdom, on the part of commanders who base their operational plans on fighting the "last war". I shall give two simple examples to illustrate this. The massed infantry assault wherein superior numbers would eventually wear down even the most determined foe seemed applicable to European observers of the American civil war where Union casualties even in the wars final years were often horrendous (think Cold Harbor) but resulted in victory. After the war of movement envisioned by von Moltke and carried out by Schlieffen and his successors in the opening assault in the West in WWI bogged down into stalemate, the Allies reverted to the massed infantry charge of Civle War days with horrific consequences.

The Pentagon plan for Afghanistan was brilliant in relying on Afghan foot soldiers guided by a few special ops guys and FACs to call in air strikes in routing the Taliban. It avoided all of the mistakes made by the Soviets in alienating the local population by "going in heavy". The problem is when it came to final assaults at Tora Bora instead of having ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks doing the fighting on the ground as was the case with the Northern Alliance in the early days of the war, we were relying on ethnic Pashtun warlords like Hazrat Ali whose allegiances were fickle and could shift on a dime. Still, without local aid to provide intelligence any attempt by the US to "get" bin Laden at Tora Bora would have faced extreme difficulties not only in inserting a large enough force at high altitude but in covering all of the passes into the FATA of Pakistan, many of which were known only to the locals.

In Iraq, the US military suffered another massive failure of imagination initially as a senior officer corps stung by the experience of Vietnam and trained to fight a heavy war of movement against Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces in central Europe came face to face with the old ghosts of insurgency from Vietnam days and couldn't quite recover enough institutional memory to change failing tactics until Jack Keane and a few others started pushing Petraeus and McMaster over the failed tactics and strategy of Gen. Abizaid, Gen. Casey and the thoroughly "in over his head" Ricardo Sanchez. Yes, we didn't have enough boots on the ground for the initial invasion but it is my judgment that a force of 500,000 would have been needed and not the couple of hundred thousand being pushed by Eric Shinseki. And even this larger force, if not employed using tried and tested COIN tactics would have faced trouble too in winning over Iraqis. Iraq's failure in the first four years of the war was as much a failure of the uniformed leadership at the Pentagon as it was the civilian leadership.

Colonel, I think I understand your point. If something is worth doing it is worth doing right. You have me convinced on that point but left me twisting in the wind with your inclusion of our Iraq and Afghanistan skirmishes. I don't believe, from the standpoint of a great America, those wars were appropriate efforts on which we should have squandered our national life's blood. The protection of oil and poppy seeds is not my idea of an American duty.

While I agree that all operations must have a strong base and a controlling factor, I dis agree as to the method in which war is waged. The days of so called conventional warfare are long past and although certain aspects of past conflicts can be applied there is really no norm for war in the twenty first century. Take for example our current financial plight and make no mistake about it, we are at war and there is no one with a blueprint for this type of conflict. Cyber war is another example we are so reliant on computers that just one sharp shooter just might be able to bring our system crashing down upon us. These are the types of battles that we shall face in the future and there really is no conventional means of fighting them as they are foreign to us.

Our failure in Iraq can be based on the simple truth that we never should have gone in the first place and initially we made the same error as in Viet Nam, we allowed politics to dictate our battle plans rather than the generals.

But our economic woes are indeed the fault of straying from the one tried and true principle on all levels including the common citizenry, never spend more than you have!

You write, "A first-year economics student learns the risk inherent in such things as credit default swaps, naked short sales and excessive leverage, but these basic things seem to have eluded those very people who ought to do something about them."

When there is a build-up to a crisis that is so obvious; when credible dissenting voices have called for additional oversight and reform; is it not tempting to believe that there is an element of intent to the questionable action?  The next obvious question is, Why?  What is the motive?

Well said sir. Personal responsibility is a rapidly declining trait, and I fear it's only going to get worse as my generation hits the 30's. It's distressing that things had to get this bad for people to understand the responsible borrowing of money. And that goes all the way from Main Street to Wall Street to Washington. I'm just worried about how many bills Washington has that are written in Mandarin.

There was a system of debt retirement in biblical economics.  The goal of this practice related to the broader agenda of promoting universal justice and freedom.  Theoretically, it corresponds with modern kindred democratic ideals.  This system of debt retirement was known as Jubilee.

Specifically, Jubilee was a guarantee against perpetual enslavement of an individual and his or her descendants.

THE YEAR OF JUBILEE

Jubilee is an historical term for a time of celebration or rejoicing. It is defined in Leviticus 25:9 as the sabbatical year after seven cycles of seven years.  Every fiftieth year was a Jubilee.

According to Wikipedia, "The biblical rules concerning Sabbatical years (shmita) are still observed by many religious Jews in the State of Israel, but the regulations for the Jubilee year have not been observed for many centuries".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jubilee_(Biblical)

JUBILEE - ANCIENT AND MODERN

The ancient system of Jubilee was developed around ownership and management of land because Israel's economy was primarily agrarian.  Jubilee can be modified in order to make is compatible with modern capitalism.

The biblical regulations regarding Jubilee are intended to come into full force only after "Israel" has gained control of the covenant domains.

CAPITALISM AND RISK

Capitalism is built around the concept of risk.  Imagine the restructuring of lending, borrowing, and insuring that would have to occur should we adopt the biblical model of Jubilee.

Mandatory debt retirement on a cycle of every seven and/or every 50 years is inclusive and non-discriminatory.  Neither individuals nor nations would have to bear the burden of a perpetual personal or national debt.

Col Jack:

Clipped to the Sports 'n' Politics 'n' Stuff group and invite sent.

Whenever you don't play something "by the book" you risk catastrophic failure--although you also open the opportunity for undreamed-of success. In both cases you mention, Iraq and the credit markets, the ideas weren't necessarily bad, it's just that policy makers did not assess the risks properly.