As is often the case, some of the candidates' positions are beginning to look similar, as the campaigns realize that the uncommitted voters represent the margin of victory. Obama's insistence on withdrawing all American forces from Iraq, no matter what the strategic or tactical consequences, has undergone something of a transformation, the result of a recognition of the realities of the situation. And McCain is now not willing to commit to keeping Americans in Iraq for a century and instead will follow a more sensible route to a phased withdrawal.
Each candidate has become smart enough to shed some (but admittedly not all) of his hyperbolic rhetoric on the subject of national defense, and he has been further motivated by changes on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq. (Their attention has also been drawn from the battlefield by the economy's problems, but most experts on the subject will tell you that government is capable of affecting things only at the margin, and that the single most powerful tool it has, confidence, is wholly a question of leadership, not econometrics.)
Because we focused on Baghdad rather than Kabul, the momentum created by early successes in Afghanistan has dissipated, and we and NATO need a renewed dedication to the strategic objective of eliminating the Taliban and al Qaeda there. Problems on the ground are exacerbated by Afghanistan's proximity to Pakistan, a place of fragmented society, unreliable military and intelligence forces, a weak president, terrorist sanctuaries, and nuclear weapons. It's hard to conceive of a recipe with greater potential for disaster. Something positive needs to be done in Afghanistan, and it needs to be done soon, facts about which both McCain and Obama agree.
On the other hand, successes in Iraq have driven both candidates to take a more measured and mature position on what remains to be done there. For example, US Marines will soon be completely gone from Anbar Province, a place that once resembled hell on earth. General David Petraeus's skillful employment of well-known counterinsurgency techniques, tactics that evidently eluded former Secretary Rumsfeld and the rest of the geniuses at the national command level, have been remarkably effective. Critics occasionally assert that success was hastened by a cease-fire declared by Moqtada al-Sadr, but the truth is that the proximate cause of his declaration was the American offensive against his militia. Similarly, there is success in Baghdad and other cities, too, and local leaders have been empowered by the improvement in the security situation.
Much remains to be done, and in a short time we can't do everything that needs to be accomplished. We can't affect the enmity among Shi'a, Sunni and Kurds. The Iraqi army is still incompletely trained, and not all units are proficient and reliable. The national police is riddled with corruption, as are many governmental offices. But, if the success of our brave troops has done anything, it has been to convince Barack Obama and John McCain that the choice is not limited to either endless combat or unilateral withdrawal, that we know how to defeat insurgencies, and that we had better not forget the lessons of Iraq if we want to have a chance to defeat the strategic enemy in Afghanistan.




