{"contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"jackjacobs"}

Divide and Conquer

Even as he is awaiting the recommendations of a high-level group studying the problem, last Friday President Obama mentioned that trying to divide the Taliban through non-military means was one possible way to emerge victorious in Afghanistan. With the Taliban geographically dispersed, fragmented and effectively leaderless, this course of action looks attractive, at least superficially.

To get to the conclusion suggested, one must start with the assumption that not all Muslim fundamentalists are revolutionaries. At the lowest level of abstraction, of course, this makes sense. One can be a revolutionary without being a fundamentalist, and not all fundamentalists are necessarily revolutionaries. Of course, to be intensely committed to revolution, it helps to have a narrow and sometimes illogical view of how society best works, but it is not essential. The American experience with revolt is a good example of how true fundamentalists can be co-opted or marginalized---but then colonial America wasn't Afghanistan.

The second step in the logic says that working with more moderate fundamentalists---sounds like an oxymoron---will keep them from becoming increasingly radicalized. Now, it stands to reason that adherents to radical Islam are not uniformly rabid, and perhaps there is some progress that can be made with those who are not yet irreversibly hardened. This thinking says that the problem in Southwest Asia may be economic and political as much as it is religious, that religion has become the answer only because politics has not.

Some say that Afghanistan has failed as a state because it has not created a strong central government and coherent national politics. But the underlying assumption is that it can, and there is little evidence that it has the potential for becoming a proper nation in the modern sense, at least not in our lifetimes. Obama's advisors are going to offer that if it's too hard to forge a successful Afghan nation from its disparate power centers, we and our friends---including, most importantly, Arab states---will be much better off if at least some of Afghanistan is free of Taliban threat and influence.

This can probably be done over time, but it won't be easy. Even if the administration is successful at weaning some Afghan leaders from the more radical objectives of the Taliban, it still has the difficult mission of keeping them on our side, and eight years or trying has produced little progress.

The political culture in the United States and most of Europe is republican democracy. In Russia it is oligarchy. In Afghanistan it is allegiance to local chieftains. After years of the effort to come, both the administration and the American people will have to be satisfied with a piebald Afghanistan, one that composed of pockets of serenity and economic development among others of crushing, medieval backwardness. This, of course, will be a perpetually unstable situation, with a scary resemblance to that in Pakistan. But at least Afghanistan won't have nuclear weapons.

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{"commentId":5817804,"authorDomain":"wharrison55"}

Yes, that's basically it. I never believed nation-building, in the modern sense, would succeed in a tribal culture like Afghanistan which makes Iraq look like a New England town hall by comparison especially when it comes to literacy rates and the like as well as modern infrastructure. The problem though remains the status of things on the eastern side of the Durand Line where a good argument can be made that the Zardari government is simply following along the route taken by Musharraf with these various truces with militants. In essence, they're trying to buy peace in Pakistan proper and if that price is continued attacks in Afghanistan they view that price as small.

{"commentId":5817804,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"wharrison55"}
  • 2 votes
Reply#1 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 8:24 PM EDT
{"commentId":5817861,"authorDomain":"jfxgillis"}

Colonel Jack:

First and most importantly, CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR COLBERT REPORT APPEARANCE!! You are now officially cool.

Second, I was damn harsh on you last week, so let me make up for it. I think you are completely correct in your analysis. The working of what Clausewitz called "high politics" sometimes demands that the national interest take precedence over naturally, viscerally, repulsive outcomes. We can't make Afghanistan into Iowa and since we can't, we have to draw the line between what we can and can't live with.

{"commentId":5817861,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"jfxgillis"}
  • 1 vote
Reply#2 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 8:29 PM EDT
{"commentId":5818430,"authorDomain":"wharrison55"}

Well we can't live with an al Qaeda re-establishing a base of operations in the FATA either. Therein lies the rub. The process of economic reconstruction would have to take place on both sides of the Durand Line for this tack to have success and I've seen little to indicate that the Pakistanis will be able or willing to hold up their side of the bargain.

{"commentId":5818430,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"wharrison55"}
  • 2 votes
#2.1 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 9:14 PM EDT
{"commentId":5818523,"authorDomain":"jfxgillis"}

Bill:

The idea is to not live with a re-stablished Al Qaeda but to live with whatever power structure emerges in Afghanistan/FATA so long as it excludes Al Qaeda.

{"commentId":5818523,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"jfxgillis"}
  • 1 vote
#2.2 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 9:22 PM EDT
{"commentId":5818621,"authorDomain":"wharrison55"}

Highly doubtful that will ever happen for the reasons I've stated on multiple threads and in one article.

{"commentId":5818621,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"wharrison55"}
  • 3 votes
#2.3 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 9:30 PM EDT
{"commentId":5818716,"authorDomain":"jimdent"}

Quiet right Bill. A line on the map means little to those on either side... and probably never will. an effort to "win the hearts and minds" such as this economic reconstruction effort will also have to disregard that boarder, or count on Islamabad to (honestly) join in the effort. Good luck with either.

{"commentId":5818716,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"jimdent"}
  • 3 votes
#2.4 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 9:36 PM EDT
{"commentId":5818998,"authorDomain":"wharrison55"}

Pretty grim, Jim, especially with many of the Europeans and Canadians saying this might be their last year in Afghanistan militarily. We're going to have a big "soft power" aid package going to the Pakis and they've made some feeble signals about accepting US training in counterinsurgency for the Frontier Corps but so long as the drug trade, and hence flows of money to the local villagers, is the primary source of income we're going to be hard pressed to succeed. The likely murderer of Mr. Zardari's wife, Benazir Bhutto, Baitullah Mehsud is calling the shots as much as anyone in Islamabad. Traditional fighting season's about to commence in Afghanistan and we'll see if these truces amount to anything vis-a-vis activity on our side of the Durand Line.

{"commentId":5818998,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"wharrison55"}
  • 3 votes
#2.5 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 9:57 PM EDT
{"commentId":5895732,"authorDomain":"lambchop"}

Col J., u were cool BEFORE the Colbert show, it is just that now more people are aware of your coolness. Are u SURE there are no werewolves in Congress?

{"commentId":5895732,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"lambchop"}
  • 1 vote
#2.6 - Thu Mar 12, 2009 10:36 AM EDT
Reply
{"commentId":5819112,"authorDomain":"amberneve"}

Afghanistan should be treated as one aspect of the larger threat posed by Islamic fascism. From this perspective, the militants would have an interest in drawing in the West as part of their own "Divide and Conquer" policy, which succeeded against the Soviets.

I have repeatedly written that I do not believe the West has much of a footprint interest in Afghanistan.

Perhaps our own "Divide and Conquer" policy ought better to have been "Conquer and Divide", that is, partition the country among its neighbors (if they would want it) and thereby weaken it. Relying on a centralized government in Kabul seems to be a mistake. But who knows?

{"commentId":5819112,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"amberneve"}
  • 1 vote
Reply#3 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 10:06 PM EDT
{"commentId":5820449,"authorDomain":"antidrama"}

What is our ultimate objective in Afghanistan? (mission statement)

{"commentId":5820449,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"antidrama"}
    Reply#4 - Sun Mar 8, 2009 11:55 PM EDT
    {"commentId":5820613,"authorDomain":"antidrama"}

    Soliloquy here!

    From CENTCOM site:

    "United States Forces Afghanistan's mission, in coordination with NATO's International Security Assistance Force, is to conduct operations to defeat terrorist networks and insurgents by developing effective governance and building the Afghan National Security Force. Effective security throughout the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan facilitates continued regional stability and increases economic development for the people of Afghanistan."

    Are we to conduct tactical operations or develop effective governance and build the Afghan National Security Force that will achieve the objective of defeating terrorist networks and insurgents? The "by" word providing the "how"?

    {"commentId":5820613,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"antidrama"}
      #4.1 - Mon Mar 9, 2009 12:12 AM EDT
      Reply
      {"commentId":5870933,"authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}

      I am loathe to admit this, but my thinking on Afghanistan runs directly counter to my long-held belief about the Vietnam War--namely that the US lost the Indo-China conflict as soon as we refused to accept the rather limited defensive possibilities that the geography naturally offered and went instead for the extremely offense-minded tactics that presumed the USA could win a war of attrition against a dictatorship by throwing in conscripted, unwilling troops drafted from a weak-willed and morally self-indulgent democracy.

      In Vietnam the smart thing would have been to build a defensible perimeter around Saigon and maybe Danang at no more than 50 klicks out from downtown, issue your dug-in garrison troops with .308 rifles instead of puny .223s, and use your firepower advantage to control maybe a no-man-land in front of your wire no more than three klicks deep, with overflights beyond that absolutely forebidden to your air support because you don't want to have to make a peace because the enemy's prison camps are full of your flight crews.

      Even Agent Orange would have worked much better as a supplement to a low-casualty system of fixed defenses. Most importantly of all, the American public would not have become disillusioned because the basically "defensive" reasons given to justify the war would not have been contradicted by the basically "offensive" strategies of search and destroy, incursions into Cambodia, bombing Hanoi, etc.

      All that stuff I understand. Given unlimited "do-over" magic power, I could have won the Vietnam War (in a very limited sense) and the ultimate sacrifice of two of my good friends would have meant something. But would a strong, static defense really work in Afghanistan?

      Just prior to World War II the Italians actually had a bit of success building a barbed-wire line down the western frontier of Egypt to stop Bedoin raiders. The barbed wire supported by machine gun nests at regular intervals were quite effective at stopping raiders on camels. Unfortunately for them, the Italians started to think of themselves as great desert warriors who didn't really need to develop a high firepower armored force that could manuever and be resupplied when leagured way out in the wasteland.

      Getting to the topic of Afghanistan, existing technology should be able to make enemy infliltration through the really bad mountainous terrain impossible. After all, no sensible civilian is humping around the mountains at night during at least three seasons of the year, so anyone you do detect out there is target practice.

      The real problem has to be people and vehicle traffic coming from the Khyber Pass or up from Iran that appear to be normal but are riddled with infiltrators and provocateurs. I would like to think that we can build the Afghan Security Force into police capable of sifting out every terrorist at checkpoints and roadblocks, but technology is working for the enemy nowadays. Technology usually favors the aggressor, because the first to act gets to try out their best new idea and the static defenders just have to hope that enough of them survive the initial waves of a novel attack to deal with the follow-on waves.

      All this leads me to the rather discouraging idea that the much-discredited strategy of MacNamara and Co. may be the best way to deal with the Taliban and al Qaida challenge boiling out of Pakistan. We just have to kill as many of these chaps as we possibly can at every opportunity and pray that they eventually stop coming. It's not an elegant solution, but sometimes history doesn't give you that.

      {"commentId":5870933,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}
      • 1 vote
      Reply#5 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 12:55 AM EDT
      {"commentId":5889187,"authorDomain":"fechancellor"}

      Mr. Jacobs:

      What you say may very well be correct, yet I am left with many questions as to the advisability of any outreach to any Talib at this point in time. First and foremost, we are at our weakest right now before the Obama directed reinforcements arrive. No one, especially Muslim fundamentalists of any stripe respond to weakness. This outreach can also easily be construed by the enemy as talk in return for less reinforcements.

      Second, while this initiative by the president rattles around the region, our mission in Afghanistan is under serious logistical pressure from Russia and SCO allies. The US logistic situation is so weak we're talking to Iran an SCO "Observer" for support. Well, I'll tell you, I don't think any study of logistics at West Point recommends basing your supply routes on an unstable country Pakistan, an enemy in Iran and upon Russian sufferance at any point in history. General Robert Neyland must be spinning in his grave over the last Tennessee football season and this ugly turn of events for the US sky train.

      Now we know why there are no armored and mechanized units in Afghanistan. Now we know why the Global War on Terror was fought in logistics friendly Iraq. When George Bush said, "Bring'em on!," he meant it.

      Then there's the argument that the Taliban are the same as the Sunnis of al Anbar and later throughout the rest of the Sunni Provinces except for Mosul. The Sunnis came over to get rid of a third force, al-Qaida in Iraq, whose brutally when matched with Extremist Islamic Fundamentalism made just smoking a cigarette a life and death experience for an indigenous Sunni Tribesman.

      There is no third force in Afghanistan. The Taliban and al-Qaida are allied as they've always been. Nuff said.

      The Taliban don't only hate the US, they hate the, in their eyes, the liberal Afghan Government that provides and protects some rights for women. I doubt the Talibs will ever go along with the moderate changes in Afghanistan. In fact, if the Taliban are in a Coalition Government, the status of women and individual liberty will collapse as soon as the last Globemaster III wings out for good.

      It's time to plan for the new offensive and get everyone we can in NATO moving with us. It's time to iron out logistics that cannot be threatened by the whim of a supreme leader or a Putin. In short, let's get our collective mess together before proceeding with any outreach to the Taliban.

      Just for grins and giggles, my favorite out reach for dealing with the Taliban is when they hold out their hands and a US Marine puts those plastic stretch type hand cuffs around them.

      {"commentId":5889187,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"fechancellor"}
      • 2 votes
      Reply#6 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 9:29 PM EDT
      {"commentId":5889604,"authorDomain":"amberneve"}

      I think you are correct that given the violent mindset of Islamic extremists, it would be a short matter of time before the fundamentalist elements in the Taliban would turn against moderate elements and kill them. Yet I am reminded that the expulsion of the Taliban by the West was a direct response to the Taliban giving safe haven to Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan rather than any humanitarian outrage over Taliban ideology per se.

      {"commentId":5889604,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"amberneve"}
      • 2 votes
      #6.1 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 9:55 PM EDT
      {"commentId":5889756,"authorDomain":"fechancellor"}

      Colonel Jacobs:

      I hope you will accept my apology for my prior use of incorrect address. Nothing personal, I can assure you.

      {"commentId":5889756,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"fechancellor"}
      • 1 vote
      #6.2 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 10:05 PM EDT
      {"commentId":5889959,"authorDomain":"fechancellor"}

      Neron, I'll remind you that the US came to Afghanistan out of necessity, not choice. Further, Afghanistan is just about the worst place on earth to fight a war. The nature of the terrain and the lack of a port makes Afghanistan a nightmare militarily let alone the cross border nature of the enemy.

      Let's go back a bit, when the Soviets came in there was a shaky but in power Communist government. The Soviets used the most brutal methods to suppress the tribesment including killing women and children. Read Charlie Wilson's Waror see the movie for more. Whatever whoever believes about the US occupation there is not a shred of evidence the US has taken the war to the people of Afghanistan in the awful manner perpetrated by the Soviets.

      Yes, our first mission was liquidating al-Qaida and the Taliban, but we also have undertaken an experiment in Democracy. I happen to believe George Bush when he says that Democracy, Individual Liberty and Freedom are the best governmental systems to fight terrorism.

      As to missing bin Laden at Tora Bora, you might read Kill Bin Laden by Dalton Fury, a Delta Force Section Leader which I believe works out to Lt. Colonel, as to some of the difficulties working with slightly trained indeginous militia and eratic leadership.

      I submit to you that the US vision for Afghanistan in practice is better than the Taliban before it and the Taliban after it if that is what is to come to pass.

      {"commentId":5889959,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"fechancellor"}
      • 1 vote
      #6.3 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 10:18 PM EDT
      {"commentId":5890155,"authorDomain":"amberneve"}

      I would argue that the United States and its allies are poorly equipped to win the hearts and minds of the people there at this point of time in their history. However, not all is lost. These people respect power, if nothing else. Power must speak to power in order to win its affection; then, with time, moderation may gain a foothold. We need a religious Strong Man who understands the West and is at least partially sympathetic to democtratic ideals.

      As you can see, the dilemma is a matter of degree, and timing is everything.

      It is the same with President Obama's spending binge here at home; the intentions are good, but is the timing right?

      {"commentId":5890155,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"amberneve"}
      • 2 votes
      #6.4 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 10:33 PM EDT
      Reply
      {"commentId":5889984,"authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}

      Perhaps the question we should really be asking is this: under what conditions should an international force substantially consisting of American elements intervene in a massively bloody outbreak of civil war in:

      (A) Pakistan

      (B) Iran

      {"commentId":5889984,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}
      • 1 vote
      Reply#7 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 10:20 PM EDT
      {"commentId":5890178,"authorDomain":"amberneve"}

      Why, pray tell, would you suggest a Civil War in Iran?

      {"commentId":5890178,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"amberneve"}
      • 1 vote
      #7.1 - Wed Mar 11, 2009 10:35 PM EDT
      {"commentId":5891437,"authorDomain":"fechancellor"}

      Mike, I don't think there will be a civil war in Iran anytime soon. It's the same situation that was present under Saddam--the State is too damn power and already weeds out negative elements into prison or worst.

      The situation in Pakistan seems much more dynamic.

      {"commentId":5891437,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"fechancellor"}
      • 1 vote
      #7.2 - Thu Mar 12, 2009 12:15 AM EDT
      Reply
      {"commentId":5915779,"authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}

      A major insurrection in Iran would seem unlikely, to be sure, but it may not take a lot to provoke one as there is discontent among the more pro-Western, relatively liberal populations of the cities, and also among the Sunnis of the south and the Kurds of the west regions. Back in the day our CIA used to be adept at sponsoring coups in such situations.

      As in all nations, the number one issue to most Iranian people is the economics of daily life. The Obama administration may have an opening of sorts to propose directly to parties out of power in Iran that we desperately need supply roads into Afghanistan and will be very generous to those parties who can facilitate such. We can demonstrate our sincerity by supporting these parties in every possible way going into the next Iranian election cycle. Perhaps we could covertly send them James Carville.

      All that aside, what the heck is going on in my old theater of naval action, the vicinity of the island of Hainan? This sounds as Cold Warish as the plot of Ice Station Zebra. This old country boy doesn't know much, but I suspect that we can't afford to get in a pissing contest with a nation that we confidently expect to fund the administration's grand stimulus and social engineering packages by buying our treasury bonds!

      Anybody want to take a bet that the Obama boys quietly accede to a new Chinese economic sovereignty zone that super cedes traditional law of the sea right up to the coast of Taiwan?

      {"commentId":5915779,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}
        Reply#8 - Fri Mar 13, 2009 10:35 AM EDT
        {"commentId":5930903,"authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}

        I may be guilty of over-posting, but in (1996?)my wife and I became inadvertent witnesses who had to file FBI reports when we were on the cruise ship near the coast of Cuba when two Cessnas with two anti-Castro men in each dropped pro-democracy leaflets near Havana. They made it back to the vicinity of our ship. Boom, boom, is basically what my report said, but I wasn't on deck for a visual.

        Then there was that Cuban pilot who defected to Florida in the Mig 29. The problem was he was taxi-ing to park on the runway at Nellis before anybody noticed him.

        The consolation about Russian bombers being stationed in Cuba (today's story) is that they don't have that many very good bombers. The new Sukhois are going to China, I thought, to help protect the new "secret" submarine base on Hainan.

        {"commentId":5930903,"threadId":"522070","contentId":"2520804","authorDomain":"mikekathycook"}
          Reply#9 - Sat Mar 14, 2009 6:36 AM EDT
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