For those who follow the war, the news was startling: after less than a year on the job, LTG David McKiernan, the commander of America's effort in Afghanistan, was resigning from the post. And just so there would be no mistake about solidarity or resolve inside the Pentagon, the announcement was made very publicly by the tandem team of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was no doubt that the general was fired.
McKiernan's replacement will be LTG Stanley McChrystal, who has spent a large percentage of his career in the intelligence and special operations businesses, and his experience is compatible with the Pentagon's concept of how we will wage war in Afghanistan, presumably more compatible than McKiernan's. Soon after commissioning, McChrystal qualified to serve as a Special Forces officer, spent years with Rangers, and ran the Joint Special Operations Command. It was troops under his direction who captured Saddam Hussein. Pretty good resume to be boss of a small war campaign.
But high-ranking officers, no matter what their backgrounds, are supposed to be generalists. That's why they are called "generals," and history is replete with demonstrations of the concept that, at the upper echelons, inchoate skill and leadership ability count more than vocational experience. Perhaps the best contemporary example is that of Dwight Eisenhower, who, before he became Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, had not commanded troops for many decades.
McKiernan is well-regarded, but maybe his chain-of-command thought that he was not as good a leader as McChrystal, or maybe he didn't get along with his boss, General Petraeus, or with Gates himself. Perhaps the military profession has become like the medical profession, so specialized that even generals can't be generalists, and fighting guerillas can't be accomplished by officers with conventional experience. In that case, we need to stop calling them "generals" and name them something else, or, as is done among Islamists, let them assume noms de guerre.
Snarkiness aside, there is an argument that, even after decades of having to fight guerrillas---even after being guerrillas ourselves in the Revolution---we still have little grasp of how to do it successfully, and that only a small number of warriors---McChrystal among them---understands the subject. But even if that's true, why appoint McKiernan and endure the unpleasant procedure of confirmation, only to yank his credentials only eleven months later? Surely his background, skills and personality were well-known before his appointment.
Single-factor analysis is always a dangerous enterprise, and most likely there are several reasons why McKiernan was dumped, but one additional possibility is a topic of conversation among those who follow these things very closely: politics.
As in any large organization, positions at the top of the military hierarchy are few, but aspirants for them are many, and almost every system of recognizing and rewarding merit leaves little to distinguish among candidates for top slots. To be sure, unalloyed nincompoops do become generals and admirals, as Laurence J. Peter explained years ago, but more often there is a surfeit of good people.
Since Donald Rumsfeld left the Pentagon, Robert Gates has successfully stamped his imprint on the place, and his stewardship has been so strikingly different from that of his predecessor that President Obama asked him to remain. Like all leaders of large organizations, Gates has endeavored to affect his sprawling bureaucracy through his appointments, and almost all of those who rose to prominence under Rumsfeld are gone. McKiernan was one of the last of this old guard.
Of that cohort, the most senior of those still on active duty is General George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, but he will be safe, at least until Secretary Gates decides on his replacement.




