As American forces reduce their active involvement in Iraq, insurgents have begun to test the resolve of Iraqi troops. Violence is up and will probably rise, particularly in areas---like Mosul---that have been battlegrounds between Arabs and Kurds or between Arab sects. Setbacks or not, the American withdrawal will continue on schedule: there are now about 130,000 Americans there, down nearly 20% over the last few months. To the very limited extent that our adevnture is Iraq has been a partial success, it is because about three years ago we jettisoned discredited tactics and instead employed proven techniques of counterinsurgency.
Meanwhile, President Obama is fulfilling one of his related campaign promises: to press the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. About a month ago, the previous commander of the American effort there was replaced with Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, a special operatrions expert. McCrystal's boss, General David Petraeus, has been a particularly articulate and forceful advocate of an integrated national reposnse to unconventional threats, rather than the use of military power alone.
This week, we are watching the start of the first major operation against the Taliban since Obama was elected. Employing about 4,000 US Marines, the objective is to eliminate the Taliban from Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan by first securing the geographical area, but, as in Anbar Province in Iraq, that can not occur if forces come and then promptly leave. The troops have to stay there.
Along with Kandahar, Helmand has been the purview of the Taliban, which has been unopposed in its domination of the region. Significantly, southern Afghanistan is the source of almost all of the world's opium, which in turn has been the source of much of the Taliban's operational money. Break the Taliban's hold on the south, and you may break the Taliban.
Military operations are almost always phased, and this is only the first step in proving that the Petraeus-McChrystal strategy will work in Afghanistan, a place as different from Iraq as nearly any other in the world. Iraq has been a cosmopolitan and centrally-governed place since ancient times. Afghanistan is less a nation than a loose assemblage of tribal groups. There is little or no loyalty to Kabul, and indeed neither Kabul nor even Afghanistan means anything to most tribesmen. The place exemplifies the notion that all politics are local.
The good news is that a fragmented country may be easier to secure than a monolithic one because it can be done one bit at a time. But very quickly after the start of the initial phase, unconventional conflict requires more than physical security and thus more than a brigade of Marines. Expertise from all executive departments, including State and Agriculture, is essential to transform temporary security---purchased with American blood---into long-term stability.
The trouble is that American presidents have a rotten record of getting their civilians behind their policies and have regularly left the Defense Department holding the bag. There is no more sobering example than a startling incident near the end of the Bush administration. When the president was finally convinced that military power alone would never get Iraq into shape, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ordered some career Foreign Service officers to Iraq, but these parasites publicly refused.
Governing is not always the result of feel-good consensus-building, but success in the business of governance surely requires leadership, and it is lamentable that leadership is often in dreadfully short supply in Washington.




