{"contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"jackjacobs"}

How Not To Make Policy

Although it had its share of leaks, the last administration expended a lot of effort to keep its decision-making machinery operating quietly and, more or less, in secret. The message that was usually delivered to the media and the news-consuming public was monolithic and unvarying, and as a consequence the Bush White House was often castigated for being at all times "on message," unencumbered by facts.

Obama promised change, and change is what we are getting, including the way in which policy is formulated. Whether by design or default, the uncoordinated gyrations of executive machinery in need of a major tune-up and lube job is visible for all to see. What we are observing is certainly change, but it is far from reassuring.

Even this early in Obama's tenure, there are many examples of fragmented leadership, but two are easily the most glaring. Reforming the health care system ("system" gives it too much credit, doesn't it?), while absolutely essential, was launched with more hope than sense and laced with the naivete one usually sees only among those running for office in secondary school. When a health care bill finally becomes law, it will be less a change than it will be an affirmation of the current system's inadequacies.

But more distressing is the public display that passes for making policy about the war. The dramatis personae in the most recent spectacle include: Stanley McChrystal, as the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan; Joseph Biden, as the Vice President; Hillary Clinton, as the Secretary of State; and Barack Obama, as the President.

President Obama has stated several times that he is awaiting analysis and recommendations from McChrystal before making a decision on our strategy in Afghanistan. He doesn't have to wait. General McChrystal's stark conclusion was already leaked: he needs more troops or the effort will fail. Several days later, Vice President Biden suggested that the military's concept was flawed and announced his strategic idea: spend all resources to destroy al-Qaeda, even in Pakistan, and forget about the Taliban. Shortly after that, Secretary Clinton suggested that Biden didn't know what he was talking about. The act ended with the president reiterating that he was still unsure of what the strategy should be.

Obama inherited a mess that was not of his making, one that includes problems in south and southwest Asia that are dangerous and complicated. Solving them requires careful anaysis and decisive, coordinated execution that uses all the means of national power, not just the military establishment. But objectives are not best reached by the vehicle of noisy, ill-informed and very public executive squabbling. And then for the president to insist that he still does not yet know what to do---well, this generates even less confidence that the current crew is better able to protect American interests than the last one.

It may come as a shock to some people that the military has a very liberal attitude toward dissent. Leaders are taught at their earliest training that, before the final decision is reached, they have an obligation to offer their best judgment, even if it is contrary to conventional wisdom, the commander's guidance or political expedience. The Obama administration, it appears, has adopted this superb method of extracting the wide range of solutions that always attend a problem. But it seems also to have decided to conduct the entire process in such a way that displays all the principals as independent contractors. From this, we'll get a lively discussion and some pretty good news items, but we will not get coherent policy.

{"contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"jackjacobs"}
  • Enjoy this article? Help vote it up the 'Vine.
{"commentId":9696596,"authorDomain":"cookaerospace"}

Thanks to Col. Jacobs for the reminder about the necessity of dissent in the US military. The value of subordinates being able to freely speak their minds is best exemplified by the failures of the Japanese military in World War Two. In a tactical sense, the initial Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor, in invading the Philippines, and especially in forcing the surrender of the British at Singapore, were absolutely brilliant. In every case the Japanese took their available military assets and stretched the capabilities of those assets just enough beyond what the Western powers thought was possible that the artful execution of the Japanese plans caught the West flat-footed and dumb-founded.

However, the Japanese were not nearly as astute at recognizing their own liabilities and weaknesses. Indeed, the Japanese high command just seemed to assume that the fact that their navy in 1941 was totally unready to defend Japanese shipping lanes against submarines would not be a problem. They assumed that their tedious methods of training pilots would not be a problem, and that finding suitable pilot recruits to replace combat losses would not be a problem.

The Japanese high command assumed that their national wartime economy could afford to continue building two absolutely huge and very costly battleships (proven obsolete already by Japan's own Pearl Harbor success and the coup of sinking the Repulse and the Prince of Wales), even though what their navy really needed was more anti-submarine vessels and especially more aircraft carriers to house a second-generation naval fighter to replace the Zero. By early 1942 Japanese high level military management was exposed as unrealistic and situationally blind on a lot of fronts. In fact, their strategic thinking appeared to be incoherent on the subject of what Japan expected to happen after their initial three tactical successes.

Perhaps the incredible rivalry between Japan's naval establishment and its army establishment is to blame for some of the blockheadedness. I don't know how to fit this into my argument exactly, but I can think of two major crashes of Japanese passenger airliners which took place because subordinates in the cockpit were afraid to tell the senior officer he was screwing up. OK, when a Japanese merchant captain screws up and dumps a deckload of Hondas or rubber duckies into the Pacific, the captain usually does the right thing and commits suicide, but that doesn't really fix the problem of a rigidly heirarchical management culture.

{"commentId":9696596,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"cookaerospace"}
  • 2 votes
Reply#1 - Thu Sep 24, 2009 8:44 PM EDT
{"commentId":9762907,"authorDomain":"tom-carter"}

It does seem pretty clear that the Administration is confused at the highest levels about which way to go with Afghanistan strategy. This war has been going on for a long time, and Obama has been in office long enough to have figured out where he wants to go. It seems he's been spending too much time on domestic issues, where it looks like he's facing some embarrassing failures, and not spending enough time on nitty-gritty work on Afghanistan. I wouldn't be surprised to find that his senior advisers haven't really been able to spend much time with him on it. What's worse, it could be that recent opposition to the war among Democrats in Congress is leading him toward reversing his original position.

General McChrystal appears to be the one bright spot in this developing farce--he's speaking truth to power, and it would have been helpful if that had happened long ago.

I've made it clear that I think we need to withdraw troops, not send more, and take a completely different approach in Afghanistan. But the worst imaginable outcome would be trying to find a middle road between going all in or all out. That would result in inadequate resources devoted to pursuit of an impossible mission.

{"commentId":9762907,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"tom-carter"}
  • 1 vote
Reply#2 - Mon Sep 28, 2009 11:02 PM EDT
{"commentId":9935942,"authorDomain":"bashleyold"}

Remember Macarthur.  A military commander has an obligation and a duty to give his views, not publicly debate his superiors.  As a corporal in the Marine Corps (a long time ago) I was expected to share my views with my leaders, but not to debate them in front of the whole platoon.

You don't like it you get out, become a civilian, and run for congress.

 

{"commentId":9935942,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"bashleyold"}
    #2.1 - Thu Oct 8, 2009 12:22 AM EDT
    Reply
    {"commentId":9765936,"authorDomain":"ira-saligman"}

    Are you planning to send your thoughts on Iran and the latest series of threats and standoff?

    {"commentId":9765936,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"ira-saligman"}
      Reply#3 - Tue Sep 29, 2009 7:41 AM EDT
      {"commentId":9778491,"authorDomain":"amberneve"}

      If so a central question must be, Is Islamic eschatology driving Iranian foreign policy?

      {"commentId":9778491,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"amberneve"}
      • 1 vote
      #3.1 - Tue Sep 29, 2009 5:34 PM EDT
      Reply
      {"commentId":9781124,"authorDomain":"farmer"}

      Could it be that our new President is aware of the age old practice of military officers getting their cards punched? It was one punch to reach General rank. Another to command a large theater. Still another if a certain number of participants can be raised for your command. POTUS may just be considering whether to give McChrystal his punch or to give him his marching orders.

      Gen. McChrystal has said he believes the Afghanistan War will end in failure if he does not receive an added 40 thousand troops. And what if it ends in failure with the added troops? He doesn't say anything about that. Has anyone told him that the fact there is a war is a failure in itself? I have high hopes President Obama will make the correct decision in the end and I presume that it will not be to become a card puncher.

      {"commentId":9781124,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"farmer"}
        Reply#4 - Tue Sep 29, 2009 7:43 PM EDT
        {"commentId":9784868,"authorDomain":"matthew-babiarz"}

        I'm not sure where your going with your comments. "Has anyone told him that the fact there is a war is a failure in itself?" It is General McChrystal's job to fight this war, not make policy. He is not going to recommend that we should pull out because we should not be fighting due to the fact that he was asked to asses what, in his view, is necessary to win the fight. No one cares whether he thinks the war should be fought. That is for politicians to decide. When Soldiers are given lawfull orders they carry them out. The current problem is not one born from inept military leadership, but from the currently stymied civilian command structure.

        Colonel Jacobs makes an excellent point in that if the administration cannot articulate what its policy is, or even what end-state it desires, how can the military be expected to execute effectively? I agree that adding more troops is inherently futile, but that's because I do not hold to the idea that we need to be nation building in Afghanistan. We went there with a desire to strike at the center mass of one of the more virulent forms of Islamic fundamentalism, and in the end missed the mark. I do not think that there is anything more to be gained by sustaining large amounts of regular forces in that country. In the end that is beside the point. General McChrystal was asked to give an assessment on what he needs to "win" and he did. Currently the administration cannot seem to decide on what to do with that information. Until they do any forward progress in Afghanistan is not likely.

        {"commentId":9784868,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"matthew-babiarz"}
        • 2 votes
        #4.1 - Wed Sep 30, 2009 12:16 AM EDT
        {"commentId":9788483,"authorDomain":"farmer"}

        Lunchbox, sorry for being so oblique, or is it obtuse? I was going right where you led with my comment. The General's duty is to assess his situation and report back while conducting his command in accordance with the wishes of the CIC. It will be the CIC who makes the decision as to whether to fulfill the General's wishes. I suspect this CIC will weigh heavily on the side of needs of the nation before he worries too much about hurting the supplicant's feelings or curbing any career ambitions. I pointed out the card punching only because it is a fact of military life that is not widely known by the general public or to some extent even within the military. If you don't know what a ring knocker is you probably think I am talking through my hat.

        {"commentId":9788483,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"farmer"}
          #4.2 - Wed Sep 30, 2009 9:19 AM EDT
          {"commentId":9802041,"authorDomain":"matthew-babiarz"}

          Im well aware of what a ring knocker is, but I am unaccustomed with the term card punching. I think I know where your going with it, in the context of a ring knocker, but Im not the sharpest tool in the shed when it comes to inuendo. Anyone that makes it to that level has to be politically adept at some level. The special operations side of the house has a little more leeway in terms of being able to just be good at your job, but I agree, at that level you do have to have some friends. That being said given General McChrystal's pedigree I would find it difficult to believe that he is a poltical hack just looking to move up.

          {"commentId":9802041,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"matthew-babiarz"}
          • 2 votes
          #4.3 - Wed Sep 30, 2009 6:31 PM EDT
          Reply
          {"commentId":9831672,"authorDomain":"jackjacobs"}

          Obama, in Copenhagen to pitch his home town as the site of the Olympic Games (Qui bono?), has just summoned McChrystal to Denmark to confer. With Biden stridently advising him, the president is inclined to limit the mission in Afghanistan to counter-terrorism. McChrystal's view is that counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are linked. In the end, the president will do what he wishes, and it will be instructive what McChrystal does. Strikingly absent from all of this is any mention of McChrystal's boss, General Petraeus. Keep your eye on today's developments.

          {"commentId":9831672,"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274","authorDomain":"jackjacobs"}
          • 1 vote
          Reply#5 - Fri Oct 2, 2009 7:27 AM EDT
          {"canLink":false,"threadId":"685330","isPrivate":false}
          Leave a Comment:
          You're in Easy Mode. If you prefer, you can use XHTML Mode instead.
          As a new user, you may notice a few temporary content restrictions. Click here for more info.
          {"threadId":"685330","contentId":"3310274"}
          Start TrackingStart Tracking
          Stop TrackingStop Tracking
          Col. Jack Jacobs's Latest Comments
          Comments & Feedback
          – Show More