Just when our interests in the region have begun to rely more heavily on it, Pakistan is becoming less cooperative. Some weeks ago, President Zardari relinquished his control of a seat on the country's Nuclear Regulatory Authority, ostensibly responsible for nuclear safety but actually involved more deeply in its weapons programs. This move is a telling example of Zardari's political weakness, and now there are reports that Pakistani military and intelligence authorities are making it impossible for the United States to operate effectively. American diplomats are being harassed, visas are being denied, programs are languishing.
When President Obama announced a few weeks ago that he was ordering an increase in American forces in Afghanistan, officials conceded that Afghanistan's fate is inextricably intertwined with the success of Pakistan's operations against the Taliban in Waziristan, with Islamabad's political and economic stability, with the extent of Islamic revolutionaries' infiltration of military and intelligence structures, and with a host of other factors outside American control.
We have been exhorting Pakistan to redeploy many of its forces now arrayed against India and to become more aggressive and persistent in pursuing Taliban and al Qaeda on the Afghan border. For a while, there had been some success in these efforts. But many Pakistanis resent Zardari's close alliance with the United States and believe that the doddering economy will get even worse under the current government. Quite a few of those people are in the military.
There are factions in the both ISI, the nation's intelligence service, and the army for whom western influence of any kind is abhorrent. Others are so disaffected that they are sympathetic to the tenets of Islamic revolutionism. Still others recognize that the nation is poor and getting poorer, and that a positive change can only be effected through extra-constitutional means. The current problems for Americans in Pakistan are symptoms of official dissent and are very bad news for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States.
Pakistan's military establishment has a history of staging coups, and if the country appears to become rudderless, there will be no hesitation among general officers to usurp power. As in the past, that may stabilize the country for a while, but it will not improve the chances of defeating our mutual enemies.
The American solution has been to send money to Pakistan in the hope that some of it will not be skimmed by officials and will be used for some good. With the situation getting less stable, many people have limited confidence that things will improve on their own. Statecraft is the only instrument of policy that may work to stabilize the country, and the solution will not be a bipartite one: other regional actors, including India, must be involved.
We have a lousy track record in diplomacy, and it often seems that our efforts are strenuous only until they no longer garner headlines. But it is through strong leadership and secret talks that we will see success, and one hopes that our domestic political process has more stamina than Pakistan's.



